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The Federal Role in Supporting the Arts:
Decline in Great Britain, Canada, and
the United States
By STEPHANiE M. COOPER*
Member of the Class of 1993
"The arts are a sitting duck for any politician who feels the need of
making personal headlines."'
Aside from the lofty goal of enhancing the quality of life of the gen-
eral population, most governments actually serve far less elevated pur-
poses when they create arts policies.2 Some countries pursue "cultural
industry" as a moneymaker, as part of a grander scheme of tourism.
Many nations concentrate their cultural efforts on the creation or expres-
sion of national identity. This latter aim is especially pronounced in rela-
tively young countries, such as Canada, where identity building is
emphasized as a cultural defense to much feared American "imperial-
ism."' Both predominantly homogenous and multiethnic countries em-
phasize the preservation of diversity in varying ethnic traditions. This
emphasis is extremely significant in countries built as nations of immi-
grants, such as the United States and Canada, where minority influence
is continually growing.
Although governments may serve various goals in supporting the
arts, virtually all funding schemes involve common dilemmas and obsta-
cles. Allocation problems are widespread. Many question whether gov-
ernment aid should reward professional excellence or, instead, promote
* B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1987. The author wishes to thank her
parents, Carole and Edward Keiner, for their unfailing respect for her choices. The author
owes her deepest gratitude to Kevin Redman, for providing the richest form of artistic
support.
1. ALviN TOFFLER, Tim CULTURE CONSUMERS 191 (1964), quoting Russell Lynes!
"intellectual speartip" argument against direct federal aid in the arts.
2. Milton C. Cummings, Jr. & Richard S. Katz, Government and the Arts in the Modern
World- Trends and Prospects, in THE PATRON STATE: GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS IN
EUROPE, NORTH AMERCA, AND JAPAN 350, 351 (Milton C. Cummings, Jr. & Richard Katz,
eds., 1987) [hereinafter Cummings & Katz, Government and the Arts].
3. Id
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amateurs. Disputes arise as to whom should receive the primary benefit
of government support: the artist or the public.4 Geographical distribu-
tion and regional policies also play pivotal roles in allocation policy.
Censorship, in both direct and indirect forms, is another prevalent fear.
The government may provide "incentives" to artists to create what the
government wants, for example by funding only particular art forms, cre-
ating a de facto form of censorship.5 It may choose to emphasize out-
reach programs that broaden audiences, often at the expense of other
activities. Many argue that a particularly disturbing form of censorship
occurs when the government implements a policy, such as the United
States' recent anti-obscenity clause, which specifically eliminates from
funding eligibility those works which embody prohibited elements, such
as homoeroticism. Censorship dilemmas include the determination of
what is art and who is to bestow its label. These concerns and others
often engender attempts to sidestep political accountability in the fund-
ing process.
6
State support of the arts was introduced to Western culture when
ancient Athens commissioned works to glorify the state religion.7 The
practice of state commissions evolved into various forms of public pa-
tronage, reflecting different histories and goals in culture and the arts.
The arts policies of twentieth century Western nations originated from
two basic historical settings. For those nations which evolved from a
royal absolutist state, as in France, sustained and abundant government
patronage of the arts is still considered a traditional government respon-
sibility.8 Other states practiced a plutocratic, mercantilist tradition en-
dorsing relatively little state patronage.9 Great Britain, with its limited
monarchy, embodied the latter model, later transmitting its traditional
wariness of governmental arts support to both the United States and
Canada.10
In the twenty years following World War II, there was tremendous
4. Milton C. Cummings, Jr. & Richard S. Katz, Relations Between Government and the
Arts in Western Europe and North America, in WHo's TO PAY FOR THE ARTS? THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SEARCH FOR MODELS OF ARTS SUPPORT 5, 8-9 (Milton C. Cummings, Jr. & J. Mark
Davidson Schuster eds., 1989) [hereinafter Cummings & Katz, Relations Between Government
and the Arts].
5. Cummings & Katz, Government and the Arts, supra note 2, at 355.
6. Milton C. Cummings, Jr. & Richard S. Katz, Government and the Arts: An Overview,
in THE PATRON STATE: GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, AND
JAPAN, supra note 2, at 3, 14 [hereinafter Cummings & Katz, Overview].
7. Id at 3.




The Federal Role in Supporting the Arts
expansion in public arts support in the industrialized world. Several sig-
nificant social, political, and economic developments occurring between
the two world wars laid the groundwork for this change. These included
the expansion of government responsibility at the time of the Great De-
pression, the growth in public education, and the increase in leisure time
due to mechanization." Today, every major industrialized nation has an
arts or cultural policy commanding heavy public expenditure."2 The
years following the massive growth in cultural funding witnessed in-
creased debate over its aims and purposes, concentrating on issues of geo-
graphic distribution, "politicization," cost-effectiveness, and broadening
definitions of culture." Recessionary times have only fueled such debate
as demand increases for governmental support while governments at-
tempt to diversify support forms.
1 4
The recent controversy' 5 surrounding arts funding choices in the
United States highlights some of the tensions that many countries share
in the area of government sponsorship of the arts. Perhaps due to a com-
mon aversion to central power, Great Britain, Canada, and the United
States take substantially similar approaches to arts funding through an
arm's length mechanism that is designed to alleviate undue political in-
fluence on the arts. But despite the varying histories, traditions, and
motivations prompting its use, the arm's length principle as applied in
federal arts support is facing political crisis and possible eradication in
each of these three countries.
This Note explores the common and distinct crises in arts funding in
Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. Part I attempts to place
the arm's length principle in the greater context of state arts support
schemes. Part II describes the particular characteristics of arts support
through the arm's length principle in each country, concentrating on
goals pursued, organization, and forms of available support. Part III ex-
amines the criticisms of, threats to, and inherent flaws of the arm's length
principle, focusing on elitism, accountability, funding cuts, and govern-
mental intervention. Part IV then describes the various government ef-
forts to maintain some form of federal arts support. Part V argues that
11. Cummings & Katz, Overview, supra note 6, at 8-9.
12. Id. at 9.
13. Cummings & Katz, Relations Between Government and the Arts, supra note 4. at 7.
14. Cummings & Katz, Overview, supra note 6, at 9.
15. Heated public debate over the federal government's role in directing the content of
state sponsored art began in 1989, when two National Endowment for the Arts grants to
artists Andres Serrano and the late Robert Mapplethorpe received considerable public atten-
tion, fueled mainly by Christian fundamentalist leaders, sparking political crisis and Congres-
sional debate as to the future of the Endowment.
1993]
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devolution and administrative changes in the grant-making process
might salvage the United States' federal arts funding structure from fur-
ther political domination or possible elimination.
I. THE ARM'S LENGTH PRINCIPLE AND OTHER
SUPPORT SCHEMES
A. Patterns of Support
There are four general models of government assistance to the arts:
Facilitator, Patron, Architect, and Engineer.
The Facilitator model assists the arts indirectly, through foregone
taxes and other efforts to make the market more accessible to artists.
16
This approach is completely market-reliant, not propounding any stan-
dards or cohesive national policy, but instead relying on the tastes of
donors.17 Opponents argue that this approach is a dangerous one, since
private and corporate funding tends only to support the safe and non-
controversial, and is often cyclical, depending on the health of the econ-
omy. The United States to a great degree embodies this model, as
roughly two-thirds of all support in the country derives from private
patronage. 18
Countries following the Patron model espouse government purchase
of artistic services and creations.19 This patronage is usually achieved
through a quasi-public foundation embodying an arm's length mecha-
nism, and is typified by the arts councils of Great Britain and Canada
and the National Endowment for the Arts in the United States.2° Such
foundations are usually established with a desire to remove cultural pol-
icy, or at least direct support, from the political arena by creating an
insulated body to disperse government allocated funds according to pro-
fessional criteria.2" The arm's length principle ideally insulates politi-
cians from both credit and blame for individual grants, 22 but nonetheless
16. Cummings & Katz, Relations Between Government and the Arts, supra note 4, at 8;
Harry Hillman-Chartrand & Claire McCaughey, The Arm's Length Principle in the Arts: An
International Perspective-Past, Present and Future, in WHO'S TO PAY FOR THE ARTS? TH
INTERNATIONAL SEARCH FOR MODELS OF ARTS SuPPoRT, supra note 4, at 43, 48.
17. Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 48.
18. Id. at 49.
19. Cummings & Katz, Relations Between Government and the Arts, supra note 4, at 8.
20. Cummings & Katz, Overview, supra note 6, at 12; Hillman-Chartrand & MeCaughey,
supra note 16, at 49. The arm's length mechanism will be more fully described infra.
21. Cummings & Katz, Overview, supra note 6, at 12.
22. Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 50.
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an accountability problem often results.3
Under the Architect model, government support of the arts is seen
as part of a larger social objective, and granting decisions are highly bu-
reaucratic, often directed through a Ministry of Culture.24 Such a minis-
try, typified by that of France, directs all cultural policies, from planning
to advocacy, and is politically accountable for all decisions. Critics argue
that although accountability is assured, this form of bureaucratic support
is out of touch with the arts. 5 Another variation of the Architect model
embraces the artist as a civil servant who is awarded with a state in-
come.26 This approach, as practiced in the Netherlands, is widely criti-
cized by those who argue that artists rely too heavily on permanent state
funding, contributing little or nothing in return.
The Engineer model embodies yet another approach to arts funding
by which the state owns all means of artistic production.27 Several of the
former Communist countries, such as Poland and Hungary, used this
model, primarily as a device to further political objectives rather than
artistic excellence or accessibility.28
Since none of the four models clearly eclipses the others in its effi-
cacy, many nations are compelled to combine government roles in arts
funding.29 Convergence is often due to economic factors, such as a de-
cline in public resources and growing deficits, leading nations to take on
the Facilitator role. Countries playing primarily a Patron role, such as
Great Britain and Canada, look increasingly to tax incentives and priva-
tization as alternative supports following extreme funding cuts.3° Many
Patron countries simultaneously develop policies based on the Architect
23. Cummings & Katz, Relations Between Government and the Arts, supra note 4, at 9.
Accountability is explored further infra Part I.
24. Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 50, Cummings & Katz, Rela-
tions Between Government and the Arts, supra note 4, at 12.
25. Cummings & Katz, Relations Between Government and the Arts, supra note 4, at 9.
26. Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 51.
27. Id
28. Eric Bourne, Culture Faces Bleak Times, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Feb. 12, 1992, at
4. The end of the Communist system also heralds the end of the lavish state subsidies which
formerly permitted a lively cultural presence in Eastern Europe. New democratic govern-
ments are mostly conservative and face extreme economic difficulties, leaving culture to sur-
vive or perish according to the laws of the market. Id
29. Cummings & Katz, Relations Between Government and the Arts, supra note 4, at 9.
30. Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 64. Tax incentives are not al-
ways effective, however, because people with different cultural traditions often view them dif-
ferently. This is exemplified in the Canadian provinces of Ontario (Anglo tradition) and
Quebec (French tradition), where identical tax incentives exist. Statistical evidence shows that
donations are notably less in Quebec, reflecting the French tradition of state support and pub-
lic expectation of the government's cultural leadership. Iad
1993]
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model, since decreased allocations often force the arts councils to reduce
grants to larger institutions, resulting in increased pressure on govern-
ments to make direct allocations.31
Within these general patterns of assistance, administration of arts
policies may take a centralized, decentralized, or devolved approach.32
Under a centralized policy, all funding decisions are made and appropri-
ated at the national level, with little input from regional or loal interests.
A decentralized approach still focuses on the national government, but
more diversity is permitted locally and some autonomy or independent
granting authority may be allowed. Only through devolution is there any
substantial local autonomy in both policy-making and implementation.
Those responsible for the creation of cultural policies in Great Brit-
ain, Canada, and the United States shared a common fear of state in-
volvement in the arts. Following World War II and the example of Nazi
state intervention, Great Britain was anxious to insulate its programs as
much as possible from political influence.3 3 Canada and the United
States, with their recurrent Jeffersonian fears of centralized power,
shared a substantial aversion to the state involvement in the arts embod-
ied by a ministry of culture.34 The ideal thus pursued in creating arts
policies was to minimize political intervention through bodies created
under an arm's length principle.35
B. Arm's Length as a Trust
In state arts support, the arm's length principle ideally creates a
kind of blind trust; funding is provided by the state to a quasi-independ-
ent arts council that then makes grants according to its own professional
standards of artistic excellence.36 The goal of the principle is to remove
direct allocation and responsibility for decisions from partisan politics,
3 7
although governments may retain the power to place general restrictions
on appropriations. 3 The arm's length principle usually involves a Board
of Trustees which is responsible for the independent council's activities.
These trustees are often politically appointed, but are expected to act
31. Id. at 66.
32. Cummings & Katz, Overview, supra note 6, at 13.
33. Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 53-54. Prior to 1945, both Rus-
sia and Germany promoted "official" state art.
34. Sondra Myers, Introduction to WHO'S TO PAY FOR THE ARTS? THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SEARCH FOR MODELS OF ARTS SUPPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
35. Cummings & Katz, Overview, supra note 6, at 13.
36. Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 53.
37. Cummings & Katz, Overview, supra note 6, at 12.
38. Id.
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independently of political maneuvering while still maintaining public ac-
countability. Ideally, they are to serve as intermediaries between polit-
ical forces and the peer evaluators often employed to make the actual
grant recommendations.
The peer evaluation system is the hallmark of the arm's length prin-
ciple and is widely hailed as the most effective means of minimizing polit-
ical influence. Peer evaluation systems, with their origins in English
law,39 assume that fair appraisals of grant applications can only be made
by other artists. As a form of protection against accusations of arbitrary
or unfair decisions, cultural bureaucracies aim to surround themselves
with arts professionals, from whom they can claim they obtained expert
advice. Ideally, this allows politicians to disclaim responsibility for con-
troversial decisions. Panels of arts professionals are also considered ad-
vantageous because rotating memberships might better maintain a
current awareness of developments in the arts, as well as introduce
greater innovation and verve to funding decisions. Critics of the panels,
however, claim there is danger of their transformation into mutual admi-
ration societies with inbred standards, where the accountability line is so
far obscured that responsibility to the public can be intentionally
avoided.'
II. ARM'S LENGTH MECHANISMS IN GREAT
BRITAIN, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES
A. Great Britain's Arts Council
Prior to World War II, Great Britain's embrace of capitalism and
the Protestant ethic led to a laissez faire attitude toward arts funding,
essentially relegating the arts' survival to marketplace competition.'
During the war, however, the British government established the Council
for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA), which was in-
tended to boost the population's low morale.42 CEMA's chief innovation
was that it did not involve the government in the direction or administra-
tion of its programs. It was an enormous success in organizing new audi-
39. Hilmann-Chartrand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 59. Judgment by one's peers
originated in the 39th clause of the Magna Carta, and rests on the assumption that judgment
imposed by the aristocracy on the commoners is unjust because of fundamental differences
between the two classes. Id
40. Cummings & Katz, Government and the Arts, supra note 2, at 361-62.
41. F.F. Ridley, Tradition, Change and Crisis in Great Britain, in THE PATRON STATE:
GOVERNMENT AND THE ARs IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, AND JAPAN, supra note 2, at
225, 226.
42. Id at 228.
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ences. The Arts Council of Great Britain was created in 1945 by Royal
Charter as a continuation of CEMA; it required no legislation and
prompted little opposition.43 The government viewed this embodiment
of the arm's length approach as a practical solution absent a well-defined
"cultural policy," for which it saw no need.
Although it was simplified by re-issue in 1967, the essential aims of
the original Charter remain intact: to develop and improve the knowl-
edge, understanding, and practice of the arts, and to increase the accessi-
bility of the arts to the public throughout Great Britain.44 The
educational function of cultural policy played an important role histori-
cally, but the public has debated whether the goal should be to raise pop-
ular taste (the predominant view of the Arts Council), or to encourage
"community arts" on a more grass-roots level.45
The government of Great Britain has never believed that culture
should be directed from above, especially by politicians.46 This belief led
to the creation of an arm's length arts council responsible for allocations
which are made on a response basis in lieu of the council directing its
own cultural "plan."47 State support of the arts was not implemented to
perform political service and on very few occasions has it been so used.
The administrative structure of Great Britain's allocation system
was deliberately made to withstand political interference. The British
have traditionally imposed certain areas of state responsibility on individ-
ual bodies called "quangos" (quasi-autonomous non-govermental orga-
nizations), which are not legally agencies of the state and are not really
part of the state system.48 The Arts Council quango is composed of ap-
proximately twenty members, including a chairperson and a vice-
chairperson.49 The members are appointed for terms of five years by the
Secretary of State for Education and Science following consultation with
counterparts in Wales and Scotland. The chairperson is also thus ap-
pointed. In most cases, there is a required one year break before reap-
pointment. Advisory panels serve the Council as specialized committees
in various branches of the arts and are responsible, subject to Council
43. Id
44. NICHOLAS M. PEARSON, THE STATE AND THE VISUAL Ai;Ts 53 (1982).
45. Ridley, supra note 41, at 226.
46. Id at 227. One former chairman of the Arts Council observed: "One of the most
precious freedoms of the British is the freedom from culture." Id.
47. The Council has taken a more active role in the past few years, establishing clearer
criteria with which to encourage and evaluate applications. Still, it does not go beyond specify-
ing broad categories of activities it intends to fund. Id at 240-41.
48. Id at 235.
49. PEARSON, supra note 44, at 53.
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supervision, for determining policy and making allocations.0 The selec-
tion of advisory members is made privately, largely by committee
chairpersons, for three year terms."I Both the Council and the panel
members are chosen for their standing either in public life or the arts."
In addition, there is an administrative and support staff of several hun-
dred people, headed by a Secretary General.
In 1965, ministerial responsibility for the arts was introduced,
although the Minister's role remains somewhat skeletal.53 The govern-
ment's firm belief that it should not interfere with the Arts Council's
activities and freedom to allocate its funds leads most Ministers to resist
public or political pressure to intervene directly. This behooves both the
politician and the process; Ministers effectively avoid Parliamentary re-
sponsibility for individual decisions and refuse to answer questions about
them. The Minister's role is usually confined to responsibility for the
negotiation of the annual grant between the Arts Council and the Treas-
ury. The supervisory functions of the Minister are limited. The Parlia-
ment's powers extend only to voting on the annual grant which, in Great
Britain, is passed without amendment and generally without debate."
The size of the grant is mostly dependent on the government's attitude
toward public expenditure at the time. Although these governmental
roles present some opportunity for undue political interference, there is
little report of substantive governmental intervention with the arts.56
The main function of the Arts Council is to allocate a variety of
grants to institutions and individuals chosen on a case-by-case basis- 7
The forms of support available range from general support to capital ex-
penditure, training, and transport grants. About ninety-five percent of
the Arts Council's income is redistributed58 and few projects are man-
aged by the Council directly. Traditionally, the Council has given great
50. Ridley, supra note 41, at 238.
51. Id.; DicK NETZER, THE SUBSIDIMD MUSE 198 (1978).
52. Ridley, supra note 41, at 237.
53. Id at 229, 234. In April 1992, an expanded Arts Ministry called the Department of
National Heritage was created to unite the arts, heritage, sport, tourism, and broadcasting.
The Arts Council now resides under this umbrella. The New Department of National Heritage
Ten Months On, TnE ART NEWSPAPER, Dec. 1992, at 4.
54. Ridley, supra note 41, at 234.
55. I& at 235.
56. Id. at 236. Since public funds are at issue, the activities of the Arts Council are, by
law, required to endure parliamentary scrutiny. Even so, there is little or no record of direct
governmental intervention for political purposes. Id
57. NETzER, supra note 51, at 198-99.
58. Ridley, supra note 41, at 238.
19931
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priority to established, major institutions,59 but recent public demands
for decentralization have altered this practice somewhat. Clients remain
independent of the Arts Council; there is no attempt to control grantees'
projects, although grant recipients must conform to certain financial
guidelines and other formalities.'
B. The Canada Council
State support for the arts in Canada is roughly patterned on the
British system, but has its own unique purposes that reflect Canada's
history and particular geographical and political climate.61 Canada's im-
mense geographical size created a highly developed sense of regionalism
highlighted by powerful local forces.62 Canada's birth in 1867 by an act
of the British Parliament featured the centralizing attributes of the par-
liamentary and cabinet systems combined with elements of a loose feder-
ation.63 The Canadian government is much less centralized than that of
the United States and accordingly it is in a much weaker position vis-a-
vis the provinces than its American counterpart." Cultural policy in
Canada is thus addressed at the federal, regional, and local levels, and
debates often concern proper jurisdiction. Central-regional and even in-
ter-regional tensions are common in many policy areas, especially
culture.
The broad ethnic makeup of the Canadian nation lends its "culture"
a special significance. It is to a great degree through cultural activities
that the scattered and heterogeneous population of the country bonds
together to form a national community.65 In both federal and regional
systems, cultural policy is considered an important element of socio-
political cohesion. Many Canadians believe diversity of cultural expres-
59. NETZER, supra note 51, at 200.
60. Id. at 198; Ridley, supra note 41, at 240.
61. John Meisel & Jean Van Loon, Cultivating the Bushgarden: Cultural Policy in Can-
ada, in THE PATRON STATE: GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA,
AND JAPAN, supra note 2, at 276, 280.
62. Id. at 276; John Meisel, The Government and the Arts in Canada, in WHO'S TO PAY
FOR THE ARTS? THE INTERNATIONAL SEARCH FOR MODELS OF ARTS SUPPORT, supra note
4, at 81, 83. Canada is geographically the world's second largest country, yet is inhabited by
only 27 million people, most of whom live along the southern border. Originally settled by the
French and British, Canada soon welcomed a variety of other immigrants, gradually altering
the ethnic composition of the country. Today, less than half of the population is of British
ancestry, a quarter French-Canadian, another quarter of mixed descent. Meisel, supra, at 81-
82.
63. Meisel & Van Loon, supra note 61, at 277.
64. Meisel, supra note 62, at 83.
65. Myers, supra note 34, at I.
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sion is the soul of their nationhood,6" and that it plays a significant role
in a country which has no national enemies, has never faced immediate
physical threat, and is profoundly disparate in its demographic and geo-
graphic traits.6' Fueling this belief is the threat of cultural domination
by the United States which affects the maintenance of uniquely Canadian
culture. The overwhelming presence in Canada of American culture,
both in arts and entertainment, often precludes Canadian competition in
and access to their own market.68 Canadians are understandably very
anxious about their cultural sovereignty.
By the 1950s, having experienced the worldwide demographic and
social changes following the world wars, the Canadian government
aimed to form a cultural policy which would build national unity and
assist in forming and maintaining a unique Canadian identity.69 For a
number of reasons, Canada never experienced the kind of private or cor-
porate patronage of the arts such as that found in the United States.
70
Government support through public agencies was thus of paramount im-
portance to meeting the country's cultural goals. In addition, the federal
government was spurred into taking on a leading cultural role by the
emerging separatist rhetoric in Quebec, which counted regional cultural
control among its key demands."1
Although various commissions preceded its formation, it was not
until 1957 that the Canada Council, modeled on the British example, was
formed by an Act of Parliament.7 2 Those responsible for proposing the
66. Jamie Portman, Crucial Report on Culture, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 17, 1991, at Dl.
67. Meisel & Van Loon, supra note 61, at 277.
68. Meisel, supra note 62, at 82. Many Canadians feel the American cultural presence
retards growth and inhibits local talent, in addition to exposing Canadians to a deluge of for-
eign cultural preoccupations. Meisel & Van Loon, supra note 61, at 282-83.
69. Meisel, supra note 62, at 84. Government subsidy was somewhat more easilyjustified
in Canada than it would prove to be in the U.S. a decade later, in large part because of the
hostile environment that Canadian artists faced in American cultural dominance. Id
70. Meisel & Van Loon, supra note 61, at 279. Canada's late growth as an industrialized
nation meant that it produced almost no massive private wealth which could be tapped to
subsidize the arts. By the time huge fortunes could be amassed, they were so heavily taxed
that further private giving was deterred. Id
71. Id/ at 281. The Canadian Constitution assigns education to provincial jurisdiction,
although culture is not specifically addressed. As culture is intimately related to education,
many provinces believe that their cultural roles should be primary. Quebec, representing a
francophone majority, believes strongly in its responsibility as the protector of French-Cana-
dian culture. Id Quebec's demands and associated problems are addressed infra Part I1.
72. Canada Council Act, R.S.C., ch. C-2, § 1. Among the various commissions, by far
the most influential is the 1949 Massey Commission, which created a wave of interest in and
acceptance of community responsibility for the arts. Its most significant recommendation led
to the creation of the Canada Council. GEORGE WOODCOCK, STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 50-51
(1985). The 1951 Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sci-
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Act espoused the principle that was to guide the Council: "[g]overnment
should... support the cultural development of the nation, but not at-
tempt to control it."' 73 The Council would embody the arm's length
model, free of political intervention and nearly free of political demands,
except those delineated in the Act. The single most important clause of
the Canada Council Act states that the Council is explicitly "not an
Agent of Her Majesty" and is therefore beyond the control of the govern-
ment of the day.7 4
The Council is the largest public support agency to the arts in Can-
ada,75 and it is today widely esteemed as one of the most important insti-
tutions in pursuit of Canadian national identity.76 By the terms of the
Act, its object is "to foster and promote the study and enjoyment of, and
the production of works in, the arts."' 77 The Council consists of twenty-
one members, appointed to fixed terms by the Governor in Council, and
the Council staff is headed by a Director and an Associate Director, both
appointed and holding office at the pleasure of the government of the
day.78 The Council and staff rely heavily on peer panels called Discipli-
nary Advisory Committees, which consist of arts professionals from all
regions of Canada who are consulted both as individuals and as members
of juries.79
Funding for the Arts Council is voted on and a-pproved through the
Parliament, to whom the Council must report its accounting and, occa-
sionally, other matters.8 0 In the 1960s, the Department of the Secretary
of State developed into a de facto cultural ministry, becoming the Minis-
try of Communications by 1980.81 Despite the Council's purported inde-
pendence, the Ministry is closely involved in important decisions of the
ences recommended following Great Britain's Arts Council example, specifically rejecting the
bureaucratized Ministry of Culture approach often used on the continent. Hillman-Chartrand
& McCaughey, supra note 16, at 56.
73. WOODCOCK, supra note 72, at 56.
74. Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 58.
75. Meisel & Van Loon, supra note 61, at 289.
76. Portman, supra note 66, at DI.
77. Canada Council Act § 8(1).
78. Meisel & Van Loon, supra note 61, at 289.
79. Id These panels operate within clearly established and widely known guidelines and
are highly valued among the clients.
80. Id. For the first several years of its existence, the Council operated on income brought
to it through an endowment of $53 million. By 1965, however, the Council's needs eclipsed
that amount, and further appropriations thereafter came from Parliament. Hillmnan-Char-
trand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 57. Today, government appropriations voted by Parlia-
ment constitute about 85% of the Council's income. Meisel & Van Loon, supra note 61, at
289.
81. Meisel & Van Loon, supra note 61, at 293.
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Canada Council. As the link between Parliament and the Council, the
Minister makes recommendations on the appointment of the board mem-
bers and other agency leaders, as well as negotiating its budget
allocations.
The Canada Council offers financial assistance and special services
in various disciplines to its clients. Its programs mainly support profes-
sional artists and organizations: about four-fifths of its budget is allo-
cated to institutions alone,82 prompting sharp criticism.83 The Canada
Council also provides some funding to "community arts" (nonprofes-
sional) programs, a policy favored by wider audiences.8 4 Although
viewed by most as an invaluable contributor to Canadian cultural life,
criticisms have surfaced that the Canadian Council's grant process is bu-
reaucratic, insensitive to certain groups, and elitist.8 5
Although many Canadians value the Canada Council as a provider
of infrastructure for cultural cohesion, others simultaneously fear the loss
of regional identity and argue for provincial cultural control. Many
provinces, fearing domination by the Canada Council, developed their
own councils in response.86 The provinces aim to promote and protect
activities that represent the regions, which they fear might be lost under
the patronage of the federal government.8 7 Since the 1960s, the sum of
annual provincial aid has equalled that of the Canada Council.88 How-
ever, there is little coordination or contact between the federal and pro-
vincial bodies, and antagonisms between the two persist.89
C. The United States' National Endowment for the Arts
Government patronage of the arts in the United States was mostly
indirect, sporadic, and marginal until the creation of the National En-
dowment for the Arts (NEA) in 1965. 90 The legacy of political contro-
82. IH at 289.
83. WooDcocK, supra note 72, at 59.
84. Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 58. The presence of community
arts support also became an important component of the United States' program, while such
support is virtually non-existent in Great Britain.
85. See infra part III.
86. WooDcocK, supra note 72, at 84.
87. Id. Some provinces uniquely support more populist kinds of activities that are only
marginally supported under the federal system. Regionally, there is a wide range of ap-
proaches to arts funding in place, from outright regional political domination to virtual auton-
omy. Id
88. Id. at 88.
89. Id. at 89-90.
90. Kevin V. Mulcahy, Government and the Arts in the United States, in THE PATRON
STATE: GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, AND JAPAN, supra
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versies surrounding the Works Progress Administration of the 1930s,
when the national government first entered into arts patronage, served as
a reminder of both the advantages and the hazards which could result
from state involvement in the arts.91 Momentum for the establishment of
a national arts body grew throughout the late fifties and early sixties, as
various reports emphasized the need to promote American cultural con-
tributions and drew attention to the financial straits of various arts
organizations.92
When Congress enacted Public Law 89-20913 in September 1965,
establishing the National Endowments for the Arts and Humanities, it
was with the express intent of avoiding both the political pitfalls previ-
ously experienced and the political pitfalls anticipated by those opposed
to the bill.94 Although the creation of the National Endowment for the
Arts was the first permanent commitment of the federal government to
cultural support, its creators were extremely wary of the government be-
coming the sole, or even the most important, patron of the arts in the
United States, and accordingly sought to limit its role.9" The Act's Dec-
laration of Purpose reveals this aim in stating that arts support is "pri-
marily a matter for private and local initiative,"96 and emphasizing the
federal government's role is merely to "complement, assist and add to
note 2, at 311, 311-12. Past support included the creation of the Smithsonian Institution,
national copyright protection, subsidized postal rates for qualifying organizations and various
forms of tax deductions for donors. Id. at 311.
91. Id at 311. W.P.A. artists were attacked on moral grounds for painting nudes and
other controversial subject matter. Paul Mattick, Jr., Arts and the State, THE NATION, Oct. 1,
1990, at 348.
92. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE NATIONAL ENDOW-
MENT FOR THE ARTS 8-9 (1990).
93. National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
209, 79 Stat. 845 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-960 (Supp. II 1990)). Conservative
Republicans and southern Democrats presented strong opposition to the bill introduced by the
Johnson administration, fearing reduced incentives for private support and state support of
artistic mediocrity. NETZER, supra note 51, at 59.
94. See Mulcahy, supra note 90, at 312. Although the two Endowments were created
simultaneously and often face similar issues, this Note will not address the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities. Legislative history shows minority views attacked the administrative
structure and potential dangers of the NEA, including political intervention into the arts.
H.R. REP. No. 618, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3186, 3203-
07. The artist Larry Rivers' comment at the time became a popular one: "The government
taking a role in art is like a gorilla threading a needle. It is at first cute, then clumsy, and most
of all impossible." NETZER, supra note 51, at 59. Further exploration of the opposition's
arguments against the NEA's enactment will be treated infra Part V.
95. Mulcahy, supra note 90, at 313-14. Consequently, public support through the NEA
remains relatively small. The NEA budget in 1991 came in just under $176 million, or less
than one-tenth of one percent of total federal spending. Id. at 313, 329.
96. 20 U.S.C. § 951(2).
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programs" advanced by other agencies.97 Most significantly, the Act
provides that, in the NEA's administration, "no department, agency, of-
ficer, or employee of the United States shall exercise any direction, super-
vision, or control over the policy determination, personnel, or
curriculum, or the administration or operation of any school or other
non-Federal agency, institution, organization or association."98
The goals of the NEA are to make the arts more widely available, to
preserve America's cultural heritage, to strengthen cultural organiza-
tions, and to encourage the development of individual talent." These
objectives are to be met through grants to qualifying groups, individuals
and state agencies."° The Act avoids forms of support contributing to
operating costs, or assuming responsibility for artistic production, such
as commissioning works. 10 1 To continue the country's tradition of pri-
vate patronage, the legislation directed that all grants to nonprofit insti-
tutions should be in the form of matching grants, up to fifty percent of
the total cost of a project. 0 2 From its birth, the NEA has placed a decid-
edly strong emphasis on support for traditional art forms and major in-
stitutions, °3 and accorded relatively low priority to experimentation and
the avant-garde at professional levels."° Spending patterns indicate that
the NEA has emphasized wide geographic availability, consistent with
the country's strong egalitarian traditions. 10 5
The NEA is headed by a Chairperson appointed by the President
with Senate confirmation to a four year renewable term."°6 The
Chairperson has strong symbolic powers, and is often viewed as the cul-
tural community's official spokesperson in the formation of national art
policy. It is the Chairperson who by statute approves or disapproves all
grants, 0 7 and who appoints all subordinate staff and makes administra-
tive decisions. The Chairperson is responsible to a twenty-six member
National Council on the Arts appointed by the President, with Senate
confirmation, to staggered six year terms. This Council was created to
97. Id § 951(5).
98. Id § 953(c).
99. Id § 951.
100. Id § 954(c), (g).
101. Mulcahy, supra note 90, at 312.
102. 20 U.S.C. § 954(e).
103. Mulcahy, supra note 90, at 322.
104. NETZER, supra note 51, at 74.
105. Id at 73. This policy presents a stark contrast with that of Great Britain, where wider
availability is not a national priority and thought to be a matter of local concern, much lke the
British approach to community arts funding. Id
106. 20 U.S.C. § 954(b).
107. Mulcahy, supra note 90, at 315.
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advise the Chairperson with respect to duties and responsibilities, and to
give recommendations on grant applications. 10
Peer panels play an integral role in the NEA grant-making process.
Panel members are arts professionals appointed by the Chairperson, for a
term of up to four years, on recommendation of NEA staff, lobbyists,
administrators, and other concerned parties from the cultural commu-
nity.10 9 Ideally these panels, which advise in numerous program areas,
provide expert, disinterested evaluations and help to insulate the deci-
sion-making process from politics and adverse criticism. This system is
considered essential to justify NEA decisions and to create at minimum
the image of impartiality. 110 The use of panels serves two other basic
functions by providing representation to relevant interests and by empha-
sizing merit and need in funding decisions.I1 I
The NEA differs from its counterparts in Canada and Britain in that
its existence and budget, proposed by the President and authorized by
Congress, are subject to a great deal more legislative scrutiny than in the
other countries. This increased legislative scrutiny forces the NEA to be
more politically active than either the British or Canadian councils,
which are under an executive, rather than legislative, ambit. 112 The
NEA is subject to periodic reauthorization, under which it gains two to
five year legislative authority.' 13 Reauthorization processes provide not
only opportunities for authorizing committees to influence funding deci-
sions, but also a vehicle to assess the performance of the NEA.1t4 These
hearings can greatly enhance public scrutiny of the agency." 5 The result
of this reauthorization process is that not only is the NEA's budget sub-
ject to scrutiny, but its performance and very existence are subject to
periodic evaluation, unlike in Great Britain and Canada, where the coun-
cils are usually only scrutinized in terms of budgetary allotment.
108. 20 U.S.C. § 955(0.
109. Mulcahy, supra note 90, at 315.
110. Mary L. Weaver, The Politics of Congressional Arts Policy: National Decisions, Local
Needs and the Public Interest, in CONGRESS AND THE ARTS: A PRECARIOUS ALLIANCE 35,
39 (Margaret J. Wyszomirski ed., 1988). The panels, however, are themselves subject to influ-
ence from the NEA staff, whose values necessarily surface through the logistics of the process.
Most panels have about 11 days per year to consider perhaps 1,000 grant applications. Due to
a shortage of time and incomplete information, panels and the National Council rely heavily
on the NEA staff for guidance, recommendations, and logistical support in selecting recipients.
Mulcahy, supra note 90, at 315-16.
111. Mulcahy, supra note 90, at 316.
112. Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 57.
113. CONGRESS AND THE ARTS: A PREcARious ALLIANCE, supra note 110, app. A at 88,
114. Id. at 88-89.
115. Id. at 89.
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Not less than twenty percent of the NEA annual budget must be
given in block grants to state arts agencies.11 6 Most state councils were
created after the NEA, and by 1972 each of the states had a council
receiving both NEA and state funds.1 17 This marked the first systematic
public support of the arts at the regional level, and provided for locally
based NEA constituencies. Most states followed the NEA model in min-
iature: an independent agency with perhaps a fifteen member council
appointed to staggered terms by the governor, with advisory panels to
review grant applications.' The relationships between most regional
councils and the NEA are solid, as the NEA is a source of guidance to
state councils and the councils advocate for the survival and success of
the NEA. 119
I. CRITICISMS, THREATS, AND FLAWS
In practice, the arm's length principle suffers from a number of criti-
cisms, threats and flaws. Despite the goal of retaining independence
from the political processes that gave them life, in practice none of the
government arts support systems in Great Britain, Canada, or the United
States are free of political control. Each shares the criticisms, threats and
flaws inherent in the arm's length principle as applied to arts funding.
A. Criticisms of the Arm's Length Principle
One of the strongest criticisms of the arm's length principle is that it
allows elitists to dominate the cultural climate of a country. Because the
federal funding mechanisms involve peer panels who make grant deci-
sions based on perceived professional merit, charges of elitism and of
favoring the status quo often arise in Great Britain, Canada and the
United States. As mentioned, these three countries tend to emphasize
support for traditional art forms and large institutions. There are power-
ful forces in each of these countries demanding a more populist approach
to arts funding.
116. Mulcahy, supra note 90, at 317-18.
117. NETZER, supra note 51, at 90. Many state councils owe their creation to the NEA,
which provided for start-up grants for the agencies in its enabling legislation. 20 U.S.C.
§ 954(g). Forty-three of fifty-six states and territories appropriate more funds for the arts than
they receive from the national government through the NBA. Mulcahy, supra note 90, at 318.
118. Mulcahy, supra note 90, at 317. Some states even further decentralize to the local
level, where the ability to assess and identify applicants is considered by many to be more
reliable. Id.
119. Id. at 320. Most state agencies concentrate at least some resources into lobbying sup-
port from the NEA, since there is not always endorsement of cultural funding at the state
level NETZER, supra note 51, at 91-92.
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Despite its official policy and relatively clean record of noninterven-
tion with the Arts Council, the British government was eventually com-
pelled to respond to public discontent over a perceived emphasis on the
"high arts" in cultural funding. As the view of the public role in the arts
evolved in recent years, politics entered the funding equation. One of the
most significant challenges to the present Arts Council is a general de-
mand to shift funding policy from elitist to more popular forms.120
Change is called for in two areas: a more equal dispersion of cultural
facilities and opportunities throughout the country, 121 and a greater "de-
mocratization" of the granting committees, who are charged with mak-
ing arbitrary judgments based on their memberships' particular tastes. A
source of considerable disdain to potential grantees is the secrecy of the
grant-making procedure, which allows for no appeals process.
Nor has the Canada Council escaped charges of elitism. There is, as
in Great Britain, a decided concentration of grants in cities and urban
areas, and provincial ministers charge the Canada Council with failure to
cooperate with provincial governments. 122 In 1985, provincial officials
formally accused the Council of bias, and called for funds to be distrib-
uted to provinces instead, where education responsibilities currently
lie.123 Press coverage soon thereafter suggested that the Canada Council
"has become a private club for cultural fat cats, to the detriment of
young, impoverished talents with greater need for the money."' 24
It is in the United States where charges of elitism take the most
highly critical tone. The enabling legislation for the NEA specified a
commitment to populist consumption of the arts in recognition of the
responsibilities of a democratic government.' 25 Yet a 1979 investigative
report on the NEA by the House Appropriations Committee found that
the composition of task forces, consultants, committees, and panels indi-
cated a repetitive use of the same individuals, resulting in a "closed cir-
ce" of opinion.' 26 The report charged that the NEA failed at its most
fundamental aim: to bring the arts to all, fostering creativity nation-
wide.' 2 7 Congress responded to the calls for diversity in 1985 by enact-
120. Ridley, supra note 41, at 244.
121. Id. at 245. At present, the system weighs predominantly in favor of London. Id.
122. Meisel & Van Loon, supra note 61, at 305.
123. Id. at 291. The call went unanswered.
124. John F. Bums, Of Fig Leaves, Art and Other Disputes: Canada, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
1987, at 37.
125. EDWARD ARIAN, THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE 24 (1989).
126. Id. at 50-5 1.
127. Id. at 53. To support its charge, the report found a minimal relationship between the
NEA and the community arts movement. Id. at 54.
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ing special legislation which directed the Chairperson to select panel
members representing a diversity of characteristics and perspectives, as
well as to pay special heed to those artists or groups traditionally under-
represented.' 28 Despite the legislative change in the NEA emphasis,
even a decade later NEA Chairperson John Frolnmayer admitted: "Our
directive is to try to be inclusive of viewpoints and all areas of the coun-
try. Unfortunately, we have yet to shed the elitist image .... 12 9
Since the NEA's creation, there has been continual debate over
whether support should be aimed at professional excellence or social util-
ity, often referred to as the "quality vs. equality" argument.13° Further
debate raised the issue of whether to subsidize according to national or
regional importance. 131 In practice, the NEA channels the bulk of its
funds to institutions representing the dominant elite performance cul-
ture, which some argue reinforces the existing system of social and cul-
tural privilege. 132 The situation is aggravated by the grant process itself,
which involves a marked absence of dialogue between grant applicants
and the NEA, and a lack of artist access to decision-making processes.
The arm's length principle is also criticized for its apparent lack of
accountability. Any country employing the arm's length principle faces
those dilemmas the principle does not address, including finding the
proper balance between the principle and accountability, determining the
grant-making body's obligations to the public, and ensuring against irre-
sponsibility. 33 Of course, it is unrealistic and undemocratic to expect no
accountability, since public funds are at issue. So while the principle re-
lies on the independence of the bodies it creates, there is still a balance to
be drawn. These issues remain controversial and unresolved in the cur-
rent government subsidy contexts of Great Britain, Canada, and the
United States.
B. Threats to the Arm's Length Principle
In addition to their general weaknesses, there are significant threats
to the survival of the arm's length bodies created to distribute arts fund-
ing. An easily identifiable threat is that of chronic under-funding and
128. Arts, Humanities and Museum Amendments of 1985, Pub. L No. 99-194,
§§ l10(l)(G), 105(2)(D), 99 Stat. 1332, 1333, 1340 (1985).
129. Patti Hartigan, One Year After Mapplethorpe: An Arts World Divided, BOsTON
GLOBE, Oct 6, 1991, at Al.
130. Studies indicate a strong desire in a large number of Americans for a greater availabil-
ity of artistic experiences and access to arts facilities. ARIAN, supra note 125, at 28.
131. Mulcahy, supra note 90, at 325.
132. ARLMN, supra note 125, at 28.
133. Hillman-Chartrand & McCaughey, supra note 16, at 71.
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funding cuts. There is growing concern in all western countries that cul-
tural funding will continue to fall prey to economic hard times, and that
privatization will, by necessity, assume a greater role.
134
Great Britain's cultural funding suffered greatly during the
Thatcher years, when cuts were particularly severe. The Thatcher gov-
ernment's policy reflected its belief that the arts were unnecessary and
encouraged left-wing tendencies. 35 What followed was a wholesale gov-
ernmental endorsement of privatization, organized on the American
model and tied intrinsically with the existing government structure of the
Arts Council. The government gave grants, via the Council, to those
organizations which could prove themselves most efficient and profitable.
The larger the box office and the more support from private sources an
organization could demonstrate, the greater the possibility of govern-
ment subsidy. 36 Those pursuing art without regard for the market were
punished by receiving a smaller grant, or no grant at all. Thatcher's gov-
ernment funding for the arts did not keep pace with :rising costs, and the
real value of grants diminished annually.1 37 Even without funding new
developments, merely maintaining the status quo became impossible.
Thatcher also introduced a controversial poll tax aimed at curtailing lo-
cal government excess, resulting in local government cuts in arts funding
and elimination of certain cultural programs altogether. 138
As politicization increased, the influence of the Arts Council waned
under Thatcher, as many considered the organization merely a govern-
ment puppet to reduce support.1 39 With no regular increase in the Coun-
cil's grant and rising inflation, the Council was forced to adopt a strategy
in which new developments could be funded only when other programs
134. Rebecca Irvin, Britain, Sweden Clash at Western European Talks on Funding Arts,
REUTERs, Sept. 16, 1987. Most continental European countries have historically eschewed
privatization. Critics charge that reliance on private funding will Icead to commercialism, de-
clining artistic standards, and a loss of freedom of expression.
135. Peter Hall, Taking Stock of Creativity During the Thatcher Years, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
20, 1991, § 2, at 5.
136. Antony Thorncroft, Minister TellsArts to Pay at the Door, FIN. TiMES, July 11, 1987,
at 3.
137. Hall, supra note 135, at 5. In 1991, the Arts Council needed an additional $16 million
merely to offset inflation in its proposed $210 million grant. Critics argued the shortfall would
not be made up by private patrons or by local governments. Jamie Portman, Cash Crunch
Crushes U.K. Arts World, ToRoNTo STAR, Oct. 12, 1990, at D20 [hereinafter Portman, Cash
Crunch].
138. Portman, Cash Crunch, supra note 137, at D20. Because local arts funding is at the
discretion of local councils rather than statutorily imposed, as is education, there are substan-
tial variances in local support for the arts in Great Britain. Simon Tait, Palumbo Issues Chal-
lenge to Cities as Arts Spending Falls, ThE TIMES, June 11, 1991.
139. Hall, supra note 135, at 5.
[Vol. 16
The Federal Role in Supporting the Arts
were cut, resulting in further public opposition to the Council. 140
Canada's cultural funding also declined significantly in the last dec-
ade and is today described as chronic. 141 The Canada Council's parlia-
mentary appropriation for 1991 was frozen, as it has been since 1986, and
the average real value of its grants declined by thirty percent in twelve
years.' 42 The Council's status as an arts patron is threatened by its grow-
ing inability to provide its clients with needed funding.
Cultural funding in the U.S. is also an economic casualty, particu-
larly in recessionary times. Economic pressures on state arts councils are
especially severe, and cuts are frequently made by state legislatures.' 43
Despite studies indicating that a majority of Americans favor and are
even willing to endure minimal tax increases to support the arts, 1" the
U.S. still spends far less per capita on arts funding than do other western
nations. 4 ' In addition, due to the controversies over U.S. federal arts
support in the past few years, politicians may find that to favor funding
at all is a losing proposition, thereby making it politically expedient to
opt for arts funding cuts.'"
C. Inherent Flaws in the Arm's Length Principle
The fundamental flaw in cultural funding through the arm's length
principle rests in the very problem the system sought to avoid: govern-
ment intervention. Intervention can be in the form of severe funding cuts
for economic expediency, put to an extreme in countries such as Great
Britain, or in the form of political maneuvering or censorship based on
140. Ridley, supra note 41, at 242. In 1982, the Arts Council eliminated about 40 organi-
zations entirely from its funding. Other strategies led to sixth month closures for a number of
regional theatres and substantial touring cuts. Portman, Cash Crunch, supra note 138, at D20.
The Arts Council will receive 225.6 million pounds in 1992-93, a cut in real terms of 1.8%.
The New Department of National Heritage Ten Months On, supra note 53, at 4.
141. Portman, supra note 66, at Dl.
142. Id
143. Nancy Malitz, States Singing Budget Blues; Spending Less on Culture, GANNETT
NEWS SERVICE, July 18, 1991. According to the American Association of Museums, 29 or
more states are contemplating reductions of at least 50% in arts funding. Alex Prud'homme,
The CEO of Culture, TIME, Jan. 20, 1992, at 36.
144. NATIONAL RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE ARTs, AMEmRcANs AND THE ARTs V 28
(1988). The survey showed 70% of Americans are willing to be taxed S1 extra per year to
support federal arts funding. Iad
145. U.S. Low in Arts Funding, Cm. TRIB., June 24, 1990, at 7. A 1985 study by MIT's .
Mark Davidson Schuster shows that where the U.S. spends about S3 per capita, Sweden
spends $35, Canada and France $32, Netherlands $29, Germany $27, Italy $14, and Britain
$10. Even at this level, the NEA remains the largest single source of public support for the
arts in the United States.
146. Malitz, supra note 143.
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content restrictions of the funded projects. No matter the style of inter-
vention, complete insulation from politics does not exist. Agencies are
staffed by what are, in effect, government officials, who are responsible
for spending taxpayers' money, and they will continue to set the parame-
ters for arts policies. The taste of the patron historically determines what
is funded and what is produced, whether that patron is an individual or a
state.14
7
The British government's most overt challenge to arts funding be-
sides its economic policies arose in 1988 when Parliament enacted Clause
28 of the Local Government Act, making it illegal for municipal councils
to "intentionally promote homosexuality."' 48 The clause aroused angry
public response, particularly in the arts community. Many considered
the legislation an obvious form of censorship of the content of art, books,
and the theatre, threatening the artistic freedom of all. The legislation
affected even the country's most notable national institutions, such as the
Royal Shakespeare Company, the National Theatre, and the British
Broadcasting Corporation. Virtually no one was immune: by statute,
any organization involving homosexuals and the arts was not to be
funded using government subsidy.149
Canada, too, has its forms of government censorship based on moral
criteria. Censorship of the arts in Canada is officially sanctioned under
customs regulations which prohibit the importation of visual materials of
"immoral or indecent character." 150 Section 159 of the Canadian Crimi-
nal Code makes it an offense to sell or distribute obscene material, 151
usually judged by community standards. 52 Perhaps the most alarming
form of censorship in Canada today is directed toward film in the form of
provincial censorship boards, dominated by Ontario. 153 Because censor-
147. Cummings & Katz, Government and the Arts, supra note 2, at 359.
148. Michael H. Hodges, Government By Tabloid: No Gays, Please, We're British, THlE
NATION, Feb. 6, 1989, at 156.
149. Linda Winer, Foreign Aid for Arts Housing, NEWSDAY, June 6, 1988, at 2.
150. WOODCOCK, supra note 72, at 159. Canada Customs is often criticized for its "arbi-
trary and secretive methods," and frequently withholds homosexual materials. Victor Dwyer,
Literary Firestorm, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 1, 1991, at 55.
151. WOODCOCK, supra note 72, at 159. Obscene material is described as that which is the
"undue exploitation of sex or the portrayal of sex with a crime, horror, cruelty, or violence."
Id
152. Uneven enforcement of the obscenity standard in different locales often results since
§ 159 charges are under provincial jurisdiction. Id. Provincial governments are permitted
under the Canadian constitution to override guarantees set out in the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Aileen McCabe, Canada Criticized for Curbs on Free Expression, TORONTO STAR,
Oct. 23, 1990, at A13. Under the provincial standards it is permissible, for example, for local
police to order paintings pulled from a gallery display after receiving a single complaint,
153. WOODCOCK, supra note 72, at 159-60.
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ship under these laws is often a provincial responsibility, standards are
undefined and enforcement uneven, making censorship sporadic, but a
constant threat. Since the laws allowing censorship in Canada are so
vague, they may permit convenient molding to political purposes." De-
spite these governmental powers, however, the arts community has occa-
sionally succeeded in lobbying against limitations on the freedom of
expression. 15
5
The Canadian government also intervened in arts policy by permit-
ting culture to become a pawn in the constitutional reform it is currently
negotiating with Quebec. In an effort to prevent Quebec's secession, the
federal government proposed constitutional amendments which would
make Quebec solely empowered to create laws pertaining to its language
and culture,156 making the provincial government the protector of its
"distinct" heritage. Many Canadians strongly criticized the federal gov-
ernment for failing to retain a strong enough role in cultural policy, and
charged that the much needed federal presence in the arts was being
eroded by its own policy.' 7 This criticism originated with cultural
groups outside of Quebec that opposed provincial jurisdiction over arts
policy and the erosion of the Canada Council's role, fearing the loss of a
unified national vision many feel Canada requires to survive as an entity
distinct from the United States.' 8 The Canadian government, however,
promised that although it was willing to give the provinces more jurisdic-
tion over culture, it would not offer up a "smorgasbord of powers." 159 In
October 1992, the promise of Canadian provincial control vanished with
the Charlottetown agreement, leaving future agreements regarding cul-
154. Id at 161. Hate crime legislation in Canada provides a good example. The practice
of censoring material that was considered offensive to one group eventually backfired and al-
lowed for all kinds of censorship molded to political purpose, from films sympathetic to Nelson
Mandela to medical and pornographic films. Clarence Page, Nattering Naboobs of Nannyism,
Cm. Tam., Sept. 9, 1990.
155. Larry Rohter, Governments, Censorship and the Arts." Canada, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
1989, at 6. In 1988, the arts community presented strong opposition to a bill tightening anti-
pornography laws, leading to its eventual defeat.
156. Laurie Watson, Quebec Offered Broad New Cultural Powers in Bid to Avert Secession,
UPI, Sept. 24, 1991. Public opposition outside Quebec greatly heightened when cultural pol-
icy was introduced as a bargaining instrument in the reform.
157. Jamie Portman, Arts Lobby Lambastes Policy, CALoARY HERALD, Dc. 10, 1991, at
F8.
158. William Walker, Don't Expect Power Grab on Culture, Provinces Told, TOR0o.NTo
STAR, Dec. 13, 1991, at A14. Indeed, many critics fear a "balkanization" of Canadian society
as a result. David Crane, Lay Off Our Cultural Industries Or Els4 Canada Should Tell U.&,
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 24, 1991, at D2.
159. Walker, supra note 158, at A14.
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ture and other provincial sovereignty issues uncertain and unresolved.16"
The original semi-autonomous position of the NEA in the United
States gradually and then somewhat hurriedly gave way to political pres-
sures in the late 1980s. Although the Endowment had not gone unchal-
lenged in the years since its inception, not until 1990 did Congress
intervene to impose substantive limits as to what the NEA could fund.161
In the past, only a very small number of grants were targeted for re-
view.'62 Substantive guidelines were placed on the NEA following public
and Congressional outrage over the work of two grant recipients: photo-
graphs including homoerotic themes by the late Robert Mapplethorpe
and a photograph entitled "Piss Christ" by Andres Serrano, depicting a
crucifix immersed in a jar of urine. Congress, with Senator Jesse Helms
leading the attack, subsequently barred NEA funds from being used to
produce or promote "obscene" materials. 163 Congress further approved
a "decency clause" requiring the NEA, in making grants, to consider
"general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and val-
ues of the American public."' 16 The arts community's bitter response
included charges of censorship and of the far right's -manipulation of the
NEA for political purposes unrelated to the agency's goals and func-
tions.1 61 Many charged that the new guidelines promoted self-censor-
160. Michael Groberman, Culture Deal Down the Tubes, OrrowA CITIZEN, Oct. 28, 1992,
at D7.
161. There have been six reauthorization hearings for the NEA since 1965, prompting reg-
ular discussion and debate as to the agency's operations. Kevin V. Mulcahy, The Politics of
Cultural Oversight" The Reauthorization Process and the National Endowment for the Arts, In
CONGRESS AND THE ARTS: A PREcARIous ALLIANCE, supra note 110, at 63, 77.
162. The works were criticized for lacking artistic quality, for political overtones, or for
offensive qualities. Among the more noteworthy: A 1973 grant to author Erica Jong for her
novel FEAR OF FLYING, and a 1972 grant to a dance group charged with pushing Black Pan-
ther ideology on young children. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 92, at 37.
163. "None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the National Endowment for
the Arts may be used to promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the judgment of
the National Endowment for the Arts ... may be considered obscene, including, but not
limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or
individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value." Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appro-
priations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, tit. III, § 304(a), 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News (103 Stat.) 701, 741. Senator Helms' proposal, which included much broader language,
was defeated in favor of the above.
164. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 101-512, tit. I, § 103(b), 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (104 Stat.) 1915, 1963.
This decency standard was found unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness by a federal court
in June 1992, in a case involving four performance artists suing the NEA for overturning grant
recommendations made by an NEA peer panel. Diane Haithman, Judge Voids the NEA's
Decency Standard, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 1992, at Fl.
165. Kim Masters, America's Culture Crisis, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1992, at 01.
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ship, inhibiting experimental or potentially controversial works from
ever being produced. The controversy also split the art world, challeng-
ing some groups to fence off the "dirty artists."' " Although few public
policies enjoy overwhelming support, arts funding in the United States in
recent years engendered a disproportionate amount of dissension, both
publicly and politically.
IV. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN FEDERAL
ARTS SUPPORT
Given the criticisms, threats, and inherent flaws of the arm's length
funding systems introduced in Great Britain, Canada, and the United
States, it is interesting to note that two of the three governments propose
devolution as a means of retaining some form of public arts support. In
Great Britain, where the debate centers on regional imbalances and se-
vere cuts of federal funding, the government recently considered diversi-
fying through a process of devolution from the Arts Council to regional
and local arts boards.167 The Arts Council may soon see many of its
direct funding responsibilities assumed by arts councils at the local or
regional levels.' 68 In addition, the federal government is looking to
France and Germany for models of highly successful local government
patronage created by national policy.' 6 9 Even the British arts commu-
nity, apparently recognizing the futility of demanding the present system
of subsidy, is pressing the central government to require towns and cities
to conform with their continental counterparts.17 0 It is rumored that the
Arts Council will soon add its recommendation that local cultural fund-
ing be made statutory.
17 '
Canada, while not as unified in its public acceptance of devolution
as Britain, appears to strongly entertain the idea in solving its constitu-
tional struggle involving cultural policy. Public support for the contin-
ued federal presence in directing cultural policy, however, is very strong
and continuously voiced. Those outside of Quebec demand that any new
constitutional deal must ensure the continued existence and leadership
role of the Canada Council. 7 2 Despite Canadian government assurances
166. Hartigan, supra note 129, at Al.
167. Simon Tait, Disturbing Comparisons Give Ammunition to Lobbyists, THE TIMEs, Apr.
10, 1990.
168. Portman, Cash Crunch, supra note 138, at D20.
169. Tait, supra note 167.
170. Id Compare the Canadian arts community's response to its government's ambitions
to make cultural policy regional. See text accompanying note 158, supra.
171. Tait, Supra note 167.
172. Portman, supra note 66, at Dl.
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that it will not give up all cultural control, the public and even members
of the government remain wary. 17 3 Despite the rhetoric, it seems clear
that the Canadian government will introduce at least a certain degree of
devolution to cultural policy making, but how much, as yet, is uncertain.
Such a move is bound to please at least one group of Canadians: those
regional councils and others who sought a more populist approach to the
Canada Council's "elitist" funding.
In the United States, Congress' act of placing substantive restric-
tions on the NEA and the public furor which followed prompted the
appointment of an Independent Commission to report to Congress in
September 1990.174 The Commission had two mandates: to consider
whether the standard for appraising publicly funded art should be differ-
ent than for privately funded art, and to review NEA grant-making pro-
cedures. 175 The Commission was composed of twelve members reflecting
a diversity of political perspectives. 176
Twenty-five years after the creation of the NEA, the Independent
Commission found that the original system for federal arts funding no
longer worked as it once did.177 While it found tha: the NEA played a
significant and valuable role as a catalyst for arts growth, 178 it also dis-
covered an increased polarization in the public on a variety of political
and social issues, as well as important changes in the roles of cultural,
ethnic, and religious groups. 17 9 These changes, together with the public
controversy surrounding certain grants, adversely affected the NEA envi-
ronment while public confidence in the agency waned.180
The Commission recognized that the NEA is charged with a very
delicate task: to offer artistic freedom to its beneficia:des while maintain-
ing accountability to the American public. While the value of the NEA
and its contributions was strongly affirmed, the Commission recom-
mended increased Congressional guidance and important reforms in the
grant-making process.18'
173. Id. Tory MP Bud Bird, convinced that the ultimate effect of the federal government's
abandonment of cultural leadership will be the "ghettoization" of Canadian cultural life, ar-
gues against the devolution of power to regional governments. Id.
174. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 92, at 44.
175. Id. at 44.
176. Id at 44-45.
177. Id at 2.
178. The Report observed that what began in 1965 as a modest community of arts organi-
zations grew nearly 400% in some areas in the following 25 years. Audiences grew propor-
tionately. Id at 35.
179. Id at 2.
180. Id
181. Id at 40.
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Specifically addressing the first prong of the mandate, the Commis-
sion suggested that although publicly funded art, like private art, should
be appraised using a guiding standard of artistic excellence, there are
other standards by which it should also be judged, such as serving the
Endowment purposes, reflecting American diversity, and employing a
system of accountability free from conflicts of interest. 82 The Commis-
sion recommended that the Congressional Declaration of Purpose for the
NEA be amended to underline that the arts belong to all Americans, not
just those direct beneficiaries of the NEA.
183
As to its second mandate, the Commission made extensive sugges-
tions for the reformation of specific areas of the grant-making procedure.
The Commission recommended clarifying, by statute, the Chairperson's
ultimate authority in all grant decisions. 18 4 Commission members felt
that the Chairperson should have more authority to help carry out her
responsibilities effectively.18 Because of perceived weaknesses in the
present process, stricter conflict of interest rules were encouraged, such
as not permitting one affiliated with a grant applicant to serve on a par-
ticular panel reviewing that applicant. 86 A further suggestion recom-
mended that the National Council's essentially policy-making role be
expanded to include meaningful review of grant recommendations made
by the panels.1" 7 The Commission advised that the peer panel be only
one of several sources of advice in the grant process, that it not make
recommendations as to grant amounts, and that its pool of panelists re-
flects a wider diversity of professions and state council involvement.188
Finally, the Commission found the NEA an unsuitable forum in which
to make a legal determination of obscenity, and strongly suggested that,
as a matter of public policy, the NEA rescind the oath introduced requir-
ing grantees to promise that their works would not be obscene." 9 It
182. Id at 2-3.
183. Id at 59. This amendment meant to convey the Congressional intent that the NEA
should act to strengthen public confidence in its ability to manage public funds. The Commis-
sion also stated its conviction that grants cannot be decided "on a grid of legislative direc-
tions." Id at 61.
184. Id at 63.
185. Id at 64-65. Recommendations in this area included making the staff accountable
only to the Chairperson, and establishing a system whereby more grants were recommended
than funds available, giving the Chairperson a genuine choice and true granting authority.
186. Id at 65-66.
187. Id at 69. In past years, the National Council's role has basically turned its "review"
of grant applications into a rubber stamp process for panel recommendations.
188. Id at 71-74. It also suggested that the NEA should provide more information to the
public by articulating its appeals process and by providing access to the reasons applicants are
accepted or rejected. Id at 75.
189. The oath was rescinded following a lawsuit brought by dance maven Bella Lewitsky
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further recommended against imposing specific content restrictions,
which were considered unnecessary, since obscenity was not constitu-
tionally protected anyway. 19°
In October of 1991, Congress agreed to continue the Endowment's
funding without any further content restriction. 191 Senator Helms and
other powerful lobbies continue to call for tighter restrictions on content
and broader definitions of what should be barred, but Congress presently
supports the policy that obscenity decisions are properly left to the
courts. 192 Nonetheless, the basic obscenity restriction still exists and the
controversy is by no means dead. 193
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES' SYSTEM
The federal government's role in arts support is currently facing signifi-
cant challenges in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. With a
shared wariness of undue government influence on the arts, the three
countries each sought a system to provide support with minimal political
intervention. But the instrumentalities and administrative structures
they adopted, incorporating the arm's length principle, fail to avoid un-
due government interference completely. In some cases, as in the U.S.,
political interference with the arts funding process has been pronounced.
The dilemma remains: how best to serve the purposes of federal subsidy
to the arts without compromising the mechanisms established to inde-
pendently allocate funds.
At the time of the NEA's creation, support for a federal partnership
with art was far from unanimous. Critics argued that the government
already played a substantial, though indirect, role as a facilitator of the
arts through tax incentives. Many felt that the proposed system would
reduce private patronage. Journalist Russell Lynes argued in 1963 that
government subsidy would, at best, encourage artist:ic mediocrity by cre-
against the NEA wherein a California court found the oath unconstitutional. Hartigan, supra
note 129, at Al.
190. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 92, at 88-89. Content restrictions arc likely
targets for claims of viewpoint discrimination which would doubtless tie up the Endowment in
numerous, unnecessary legal battles.
191. Laura Van Tuyl, Congress Ends Debate on NEA - For Now, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Nov. 7, 1991, at 12.
192. At the reappropriation hearings in 1991, Helms argued that the guidelines were too
mild and that the NEA continues to fund the same kind of offensive works which originally
brought it before Congress. Id.
193. Lawsuits against the NEA, for example, persist over the anti-obscenity requirement
and decency clause. Van Tuyl, supra note 191, at 12.
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ating a bureaucracy which would decide by committee vote-engender-
ing a spirit of compromise and conservatism. 194 At worst, he foresaw
attempts at political control of culture. 195 Politicians of the time were
well aware of previous episodes of political interference in the arts, in-
cluding creeping suspicions of artists' communist connections in the
1950s, and censorship of federal theatre for political and sexual content
during the Works Progress Administration. In 1965, House Minority
members attacked the perceived creation of 'Federal [art] Czars."
1 96
They also criticized the failure to consider alternatives to the NEA, sug-
gesting direct support be limited to grants for capital developments, not
operating expenses or costs of artistic production. 197 Congressman Quie
suggested NEA grants should be made only to institutions who in turn
select individual projects for funding. 198
Many of the dangers anticipated by the NEA's critics in 1965 have
surfaced today. There is much public criticism of the panel system, in-
cluding charges of elitism and political compromise. More significantly,
Congressionally-imposed content restrictions on NEA grants illustrate
exactly the kind of direct political control many feared from a federal
role in the arts. The NEA cannot serve its primary and original purpose
to strengthen the role of the arts in American life when it is used as a
political pawn, which only impairs public confidence in the agency. Nor
are the NEA's counterparts in Great Britain and Canada much better
able to serve their purposes in present political climates. Granted, polit-
ical intervention in these countries is markedly different than in the U.S.,
where moralistic fervor, not economic or political realities, seems to dic-
tate arts policy. Nonetheless, the three countries face significant arts cri-
ses which will not cease without concerted efforts to improve the present
systems' weaknesses and to strengthen government initiatives to make
the requisite changes.
The aim of this Note is not to argue whether a nation should fund
the arts but rather, given the requisite desire, to discuss how best to pro-
vide this support. Assuming there is sufficient appetite in the U.S. for
state arts support, the federal government should recognize the present
system's weaknesses and consider a devolution of arts responsibilities
such as that presently contemplated in Great Britain and Canada.
Although those countries turn to it for very different reasons, devolution
194. ToFFLER, supra note 1, at 191.
195. Id.
196. H.R. REP. No. 618, supra note 94, at 3203.
197. Id at 3207.
198. Id at 3208.
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may prove a viable alternative for a variety of federal funding problems.
Because the public is rapidly losing confidence in the American system of
federal arts subsidy, devolution may present one of few feasible methods
of retaining the integrity of public arts subsidy as it was intended to oper-
ate in the United States.
The potential for public support of a devolved system to a great de-
gree depends on the history, aims, and composition of a particular gov-
eminent. In Great Britain, for example, where repeated charges of
elitism and austere funding measures created considerable opposition to
the Arts Council, public support of regional and local roles in arts sup-
port is potent. The British public may believe that the alternative would
be to lose arts support altogether. Conversely, where the Canada Coun-
cil enjoys significant public support and relatively minor criticism, there
is very little support for a devolved approach to cultural policy. Can-
ada's emphasis on culture as an identity-building mechanism to create
national cohesion will probably not diminish as long as the United States
continues to threaten with its cultural imperialism. As a political solu-
tion to a constitutional crisis, devolution may appeal to the Canadian
government, but it is very unlikely to appeal to most Canadians.
Clearly, for a system of devolution to be viable, it must answer the
needs for which it is introduced. The NEA is presently fighting a
number of battles, particularly charges of elitism and direct political in-
tervention. By taking a uniquely regional approach to arts support, the
federal government would address funding crises at levels which could
prove more practical and less politically charged. One of the primary
merits of devolution is the proximity it offers to arts constituencies: not
only do state agencies offer a more localized and intimate knowledge of
the artists, they also have a deeper understanding of the needs and stan-
dards of the community. This may prove essential if, for example, ob-
scenity will be judged by community standards, posing an administrative
nightmare at the federal level. As to elitism, whether value in a given
region is placed on community or fine art, these preferences can be better
accommodated under a devolved system.
Administering federal arts support on a regional level, such as
through state agencies, also offers greater equality in the geographic dis-
tribution of funds. Dividing allocations according to state population or
other demographic profiles provides equitable mechanisms to distribute
block grants. To assure more effective democratic representation, state
agencies might even partially devolve to the local level, where a portion
of grant decisions could be made.
Devolution, however, only addresses the problem of political inter-
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vention on a limited scale, by removing the dilemma from the federal to
the state level. As the Independent Commission found, arts support ex-
ists for the public as much as for the artists. The grant-making bodies
must still act responsibly in their roles, no matter what the level of allo-
cation. Administrative reform may provide a solution to the kinds of
political interference Americans have witnessed in the last few years.
It is interesting to note that direct administrative reform has only
infrequently been suggested as a response to the political woes of the arts
councils of both Great Britain and Canada. This is no doubt due, in
part, to the particular problems of those institutions, which administra-
tive reform may not effectively address. In addition, direct and indirect
censorship in both countries is somewhat facilitated by governmental
policy and, in some cases, is officially sanctioned.
The administrative recommendations of the Independent Commis-
sion fail to remove the threats of undue political intervention with the
Endowment as thoroughly as one might hope. The Chairperson of the
NEA, with his or her supreme grant-making authority, should not be
appointed by the President, with the possibility of renewal, since this
only enforces political allegiance to the government in power. Applying
the basic model of the NEA at the state levels, it would seem far more
democratic and better suited to deterring political intervention to elect
the Chairperson from the ranks of the Council to limited terms and stag-
gered renewals. State Council members might be more effectively ap-
pointed by the state legislature than the governor or any one individual
to whom favors might later be owed.
Peer panel members should also serve staggered terms and adhere to
much more stringent conflict of interest rules than presently exist to fur-
ther combat cronyism. Peer panels at state and local levels should ac-
tively represent both majority and minority viewpoints of the
constituency-a recommendation that is much more feasible at the state
than the national level, where sheer numbers would prohibit accomplish-
ing such a goal.
Finally, the possibility of limiting grants to institutions rather than
individuals warrants further study, although this concededly invites con-
tinued political intervention, since politicians can attack an institution as
easily as an individual grant. Another option would be to fund only capi-
tal expenditures, as recommended at the NEAs inception in the 1960s.
However, it does not seem feasible or fair to now remove the kind of
project support on which institutions have come to depend in the years
since the Endowment's creation.
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VI. CONCLUSION
No government funding of the arts will ever be completely free of
political influence, nor should it. The arm's length principle, implying a
delicate balance, was designed and implemented to curb, not fully elimi-
nate, political interference. As the principle now exdsts in arts funding,
however, it seems unable to serve its aims and fight mounting political
intervention, at least at the federal level. Undoubtedly due to a variety of
histories and traditions, it seems that some political cultures cannot resist
the temptation to meddle in areas they themselves have labelled off-limits
to politics. Many countries employing the arm's length principle in arts
funding neglect to install mechanisms ensuring maximum protection
from undue governmental interference. Those countries, especially the
United States, will pay a high price in the forms of cultural loss and
public disregard of governmental institutions.
The various dilemmas governments face in maintaining a federal
role while employing the arm's length principle in arts support are amply
illustrated by the experiences of Great Britain, Canada, and the United
States. Although the problems these countries face conform somewhat
to their unique histories and goals, the problems described are also com-
monly shared. The British and Canadian governments are pursuing dev-
olution as a possible answer to their arts subsidy problems, while the
United States continues to struggle with excessive and overt government
interference and a fundamentalist right which calls for further political
intervention. The NEA is caught in the middle of a political struggle,
unable to satisfy Congress, its clients or the greater public. The NEA, as
the United States' embodiment of the arm's length principle in the arts,
has come to symbolize the very thing it was created to avoid: excessive
governmental intervention and control over what constitutes art.
Devolution and administrative reform of the government's grant-
making process may provide the only hope for continued, quasi-in-
dependent federal support of the arts in the United States. By allotting
predetermined sums for states to grant to individuals and institutions
based on objective criteria, public arts subsidy might continue to serve
the original aims of the NEA. But without such devolution, or alterna-
tively, substantial reform in the present political climate and structure of
the NEA, there is little chance of maintaining the integrity of an Ameri-
can federal system of arts funding.
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